# Beyond Redistribution: Accountability Mechanisms as a Third Way in Economic Policy

**Craig [Last Name]**
Independent Researcher

**November 2025**

**SSRN Working Paper**

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## Abstract

This paper proposes a comprehensive economic policy framework that addresses wealth inequality, healthcare access, and fiscal sustainability through structural accountability mechanisms rather than traditional redistributive taxation. The framework centers on two interconnected innovations: (1) a Gross Revenue Tax (GRT) replacing federal income taxes, collected automatically at point-of-sale to minimize evasion and eliminate compliance burdens, and (2) universal Stability Accounts providing each citizen $25,000 at birth, growing at market rates to fund lifetime healthcare and education costs, with remainder retained at retirement.

Unlike conventional policy approaches that pit economic growth against redistribution, this framework aligns incentives such that corporate profit maximization and worker prosperity become complementary rather than competing objectives. The accountability mechanisms—automatic tax collection, transparent budgeting, and productivity-sharing incentives—make regulatory evasion structurally difficult rather than merely illegal.

We present 30-year fiscal projections demonstrating revenue neutrality in Year 1, debt elimination by Year 30-40, and sustainable long-term surpluses. Sensitivity analysis examines model robustness under varying growth, healthcare cost, and implementation assumptions. We acknowledge significant political economy challenges, including the constitutional amendments required and transition disruption costs.

The framework is presented not as politically feasible under current conditions, but as a coherent alternative worth developing before the anticipated Medicare/Social Security solvency crisis (2031-2035) creates a reform window. We invite critique from economists across ideological perspectives.

**Keywords:** tax reform, wealth inequality, universal basic services, consumption taxation, fiscal policy, accountability mechanisms, baby bonds, healthcare reform

**JEL Codes:** H20, H51, H55, D63, P16

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## 1. Introduction

The United States faces a convergence of economic crises that current policy frameworks appear unable to resolve. National debt has reached $35 trillion and is projected to exceed $180 trillion by 2055 on current trajectory (CBO, 2024). Wealth concentration has accelerated to the point where the top 1% holds more wealth than the bottom 90% combined (Federal Reserve, 2023). An estimated 68,000 Americans die annually due to lack of health insurance (Galvani et al., 2022). Medicare's Hospital Insurance Fund faces depletion by approximately 2031, with Social Security following by 2034 (Trustees Reports, 2024).

These crises are typically addressed through policy proposals that accept a fundamental tradeoff between economic growth and redistribution. Conservative approaches prioritize growth through tax reduction and deregulation, accepting increased inequality as a necessary cost. Progressive approaches prioritize redistribution through taxation and transfers, accepting potential drag on economic dynamism. Both frameworks assume that improving outcomes for one group requires extracting resources from another—a zero-sum framing.

This paper proposes an alternative framework based on a different premise: that the apparent tradeoff between growth and equity results from misaligned incentives rather than fundamental economic constraints. When system design makes regulatory evasion easier than compliance, rational actors will evade. When cooperation is structurally easier than cheating, rational actors will cooperate. The framework applies this insight—drawn from mechanism design theory and institutional economics—to construct a positive-sum economic system where corporate profit maximization and broad-based prosperity become complementary rather than competing objectives.

The proposed framework, termed Accountable Infinite Prosperity (AIP), consists of two core mechanisms:

1. **Gross Revenue Tax (GRT):** A consumption-based tax replacing all federal income taxes, collected automatically at point-of-sale through existing payment infrastructure. The GRT eliminates compliance burdens for individuals (no filing required), closes evasion opportunities that currently cost approximately $600 billion annually, and provides transparent linkage between government spending and tax rates.

2. **Universal Stability Accounts:** Individual accounts receiving $25,000 at birth, invested in diversified portfolios, funding healthcare and education costs throughout life, with substantial remainder at retirement. These accounts replace Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and student loan programs with a unified system creating individual wealth ownership while maintaining universal access to services.

The framework also includes supporting mechanisms for balanced budget requirements, Western Hemisphere economic integration, monetary policy reform, and productivity-sharing incentives linking corporate tax treatment to worker compensation practices.

We present 30-year fiscal projections showing revenue neutrality in Year 1, consistent surpluses throughout the period, and national debt elimination by Year 30-40. We document all assumptions, provide sensitivity analysis for key variables, and identify break points where the model fails.

We do not claim political feasibility under current conditions. Constitutional amendments requiring two-thirds congressional approval and three-fourths state ratification demand extraordinary consensus. However, we argue that the anticipated entitlement insolvency crisis (2031-2035) will create conditions where major structural reform becomes possible—and that having coherent alternatives developed in advance will determine whether that crisis produces constructive change or chaotic collapse.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops the theoretical framework grounding the proposal in mechanism design and institutional economics. Section 3 details the Gross Revenue Tax mechanism. Section 4 explains Stability Accounts. Section 5 presents fiscal projections. Section 6 analyzes political economy challenges. Section 7 acknowledges limitations and invites critique. Section 8 concludes.

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## 2. Theoretical Framework

### 2.1 The Accountability Principle

The core insight underlying this framework derives from mechanism design theory: system outcomes depend not only on participant preferences but on the incentive structures that shape available choices (Hurwicz, 1960; Myerson, 1981). When institutional design makes certain behaviors more costly than alternatives, rational actors adjust accordingly—regardless of moral preferences.

This insight has been successfully applied in numerous contexts:

- **Escrow systems** in real estate transactions make it structurally impossible for either party to cheat, enabling transactions between strangers who have no basis for trust.
- **Insurance pooling** aligns individual incentives with collective risk management, producing outcomes superior to individual self-insurance.
- **Traffic enforcement** through automated cameras changes behavior more effectively than moral appeals to safe driving.

In each case, the key is not changing what people want, but changing which actions are easiest to accomplish. The framework proposed here applies this same logic to economic policy: rather than relying on enforcement to punish non-compliance after the fact, design systems where compliance is the path of least resistance.

### 2.2 Positive-Sum vs. Zero-Sum Framing

Standard policy debates assume zero-sum dynamics: higher taxes on corporations mean lower profits; higher wages mean lower returns to capital; government spending crowds out private investment. This framing treats the economy as a fixed pie to be divided.

An alternative framing recognizes that institutional design affects the size of the pie, not merely its distribution. When workers have higher purchasing power, corporations sell more products. When universal healthcare eliminates medical bankruptcy, workers take entrepreneurial risks that create new businesses. When fiscal sustainability eliminates sovereign debt risk, lower interest rates reduce borrowing costs economy-wide.

Under this framing, the question is not "who gets what share?" but "what institutional design maximizes total value created while ensuring broad participation in that value?"

The proposed framework attempts to answer this question by creating accountability mechanisms that make value creation and value sharing complementary rather than competing objectives.

### 2.3 Comparison to Existing Approaches

The framework differs from conventional policy approaches in several ways:

**Compared to conservative/supply-side approaches:** Agrees that compliance burden reduction and regulatory simplicity promote economic dynamism. Disagrees that tax reduction necessarily produces optimal outcomes; instead, proposes simplification without reduction in Year 1 revenue.

**Compared to progressive/redistributive approaches:** Agrees that wealth concentration and inadequate public services are serious problems. Disagrees that redistribution through complex tax-and-transfer systems is the most effective solution; instead, proposes structural mechanisms that produce equitable outcomes without ongoing redistribution.

**Compared to libertarian approaches:** Agrees that individual ownership and market mechanisms generally outperform government administration. Disagrees that market outcomes without public infrastructure produce optimal results; instead, proposes government provision of platform (accounts, basic services) within which market dynamics operate.

**Compared to social democratic approaches:** Agrees that universal services and strong safety nets produce superior societal outcomes. Disagrees that these must come at the cost of economic dynamism or require permanent redistribution; instead, proposes self-funding mechanisms that align individual and collective interests.

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## 3. The Gross Revenue Tax (GRT)

### 3.1 Structure and Mechanics

The Gross Revenue Tax replaces all federal income-based taxes—individual income tax, corporate income tax, payroll taxes, and estate taxes—with a single point-of-sale tax on consumption.

**Rate:** 13.2% in Year 1, declining to approximately 2.5% by Year 30+ as debt is eliminated and other efficiency gains materialize.

**Collection:** Automatic withholding at point of transaction through existing payment infrastructure. When a consumer purchases goods or services, GRT is added to the price and remitted by the payment processor (Visa, Mastercard, bank, etc.) directly to the Treasury.

**Scope:** All domestic consumption of goods and services. Exports are exempt (maintaining international competitiveness). Business-to-business intermediate inputs are exempt (preventing cascading taxation). Financial transactions (loans, investments) are exempt (preventing market distortion).

### 3.2 Revenue Projections

Current federal revenue from replaced taxes is approximately $4.4 trillion from individual income tax and $1.6 trillion from payroll taxes, with corporate tax and estate tax contributing additional amounts. Total replaced revenue is approximately $6.2 trillion.

Current GDP is approximately $28 trillion, but gross economic output (including intermediate transactions) is approximately $46 trillion. At 13.2% with 5% evasion, GRT generates approximately $6.1 trillion—revenue neutral with current collection.

The critical advantage is eliminating the "tax gap"—the difference between taxes owed and taxes collected. The IRS estimates this gap at approximately 15% for income taxes, representing over $600 billion in annual lost revenue. Point-of-sale collection reduces this gap to an estimated 5% (the cash economy), representing a substantial effective revenue increase.

### 3.3 Evasion Resistance

The GRT is designed to make evasion structurally difficult rather than merely illegal:

**Current evasion strategies that become irrelevant:**
- *Offshore profit shifting:* GRT applies to the location of sale, not the location of profit booking. If a product is sold in the United States, GRT is collected regardless of where the corporation claims its profits.
- *Transfer pricing manipulation:* GRT applies only to final consumer sales, not intermediate transfers. Complex transfer pricing between subsidiaries becomes irrelevant.
- *Stock-based compensation:* GRT is based on revenue, not income. Whether executives are paid in cash or stock has no effect on GRT liability.
- *Complex deduction strategies:* GRT has no deductions. The strategies employed by high-income individuals to minimize taxable income—real estate depreciation, charitable remainder trusts, opportunity zones—have no GRT equivalent.

**Remaining evasion vector:** Cash transactions. Approximately 5% of economic activity occurs in cash, and some of this will evade GRT. This is accepted as reasonable leakage—significantly better than the current 15% income tax gap.

### 3.4 Behavioral Adjustments

The GRT includes rate adjustments that incentivize wage growth tracking productivity—the key mechanism for non-inflationary economic growth:

**Primary Credit (Rate Reduction):**
Companies whose employee compensation tracks productivity growth receive a -10.5% rate bonus (reducing effective rate from 13.2% to approximately 11.8%). This is the core mechanism: when wages rise with output, purchasing power increases without inflationary pressure.

**Bonus Credits:**
- Profit-sharing with workers: additional -2% reduction
- Domestic production within Alliance nations: additional -2% reduction
- Maximum combined reduction: 13.2% → ~9.5% (with all criteria)

**Debits (Rate Increase):**
Companies pay penalties when wages lag productivity:
- Wages below productivity growth: +10% penalty (13.2% → 14.5%)
- Wages stagnant while profits rise: +15% penalty (→ 15.2%)
- Offshore production to avoid wage requirements: +10% penalty
- Maximum penalty: 13.2% → 17.2%

**Mechanism Design:**
This creates market-based incentives rather than regulatory mandates. Companies retain full autonomy over compensation decisions—they simply face different tax rates based on those decisions. Payroll data already exists to measure wage growth vs. output growth, making enforcement automatic rather than adversarial.

**Inflation Control:**
The wages-track-productivity requirement is specifically designed as an inflation control mechanism. When compensation rises proportionally with output, aggregate demand increases without excess money chasing fixed supply. This is the structural alternative to Federal Reserve interest rate manipulation.

**Expected Outcome:**
With rational actors, most companies will choose the lower-rate compliant path, particularly as labor markets tighten due to universal healthcare (eliminating job lock) and education (increasing worker mobility). The +160% purchasing power gain for workers emerges from this incentive structure, not from government wage mandates.

### 3.5 Stability Reserve (Counter-Cyclical Protection)

Raising taxes during economic downturns is pro-cyclical—it deepens recessions. The framework includes a Stability Reserve to prevent this:

**Reserve Parameters:**
- Target size: $2 trillion (4% of GDP, adjusts with economy)
- Trigger: GDP decline >2% OR declared national emergency
- Rule: Reserve MUST be depleted before any GRT rate increase
- Repayment: 7 years maximum, +0.3-0.5% temporary surcharge during recovery
- Rebuild requirement: Reserve must return to target before rate drops below baseline

**Design Rationale:**
During crisis, the reserve maintains government services without rate increases that would suppress consumer spending. Rate adjustments occur only during recovery, when the economy can absorb them. This transforms GRT from a potentially pro-cyclical tax into a stabilizing force.

### 3.6 Wealth Preservation Closure

The GRT includes provisions to close the "Buy, Borrow, Die" loophole that allows substantial wealth to escape taxation under the current system.

**The Problem:**
Under current law, wealthy individuals can: (1) purchase appreciating assets, (2) hold them indefinitely without taxation on unrealized gains, (3) borrow against those assets to fund consumption (loans are not taxable income), and (4) pass the assets to heirs upon death, who receive a "step-up" in cost basis that permanently eliminates the unrealized gains from taxation.

**AIP Solution - Two Rules:**

1. **Asset-Backed Loan Trigger:** Loans exceeding $1 million secured by appreciated assets trigger GRT on the proportional unrealized gain. Example: $10M stock position (cost basis $1M), $5M loan = $4.5M proportional gain taxed at 13.2% = $594K GRT.

2. **Death Realization:** Death is a realization event for all unrealized gains. No step-up basis for heirs. Estate pays GRT on all appreciation before inheritance transfer.

**Design Rationale:**
The $1M threshold preserves normal mortgage and consumer lending while capturing wealth-preservation strategies. The death realization provision ensures that gains cannot be permanently deferred through inheritance.

### 3.7 Regressivity Concerns

Consumption taxes are typically regressive, as lower-income households spend a higher percentage of income on consumption. This is a legitimate concern that must be addressed.

The framework addresses regressivity through three mechanisms:

1. **Stability Account wealth floor:** Every citizen accumulates substantial wealth ($1.89M at retirement) regardless of income level. Over a lifetime, the progressive impact of universal wealth dominates the regressive impact of consumption taxation.

2. **Universal services eliminate out-of-pocket costs:** Healthcare and education—major household expenses—are paid through Stability Accounts rather than out-of-pocket. Lower-income households benefit disproportionately from this elimination of direct costs.

3. **Lifecycle analysis:** While GRT is regressive in annual snapshot, the combination of GRT and Stability Accounts is progressive across the lifecycle. A minimum-wage worker paying more of their income in GRT also receives $1.89M at retirement—an outcome far more progressive than the current system.

### 3.8 International Considerations

Exports are GRT-exempt, maintaining competitiveness of American goods and services in international markets. This is standard practice for consumption-based taxes (VAT in Europe functions similarly).

Imports are subject to GRT at the point of domestic sale, ensuring equivalent treatment of foreign and domestic goods. No separate import tariff structure is required, as GRT automatically applies to all domestic consumption regardless of origin.

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## 4. Universal Stability Accounts

### 4.1 Structure and Mechanics

Stability Accounts are individual investment accounts established at birth (or citizenship) for every American.

**Initial deposit:** $25,000

**Investment:** Diversified portfolio (similar to target-date retirement funds or the Thrift Savings Plan) with automatic rebalancing.

**Expected return:** 6.88% annually (conservative estimate based on historical market returns, adjusted for fees, and supplemented by structural stabilization from continuous inflows).

**Permitted uses:** Healthcare (up to $400,000 lifetime cap) and education (actual costs incurred)

**Retirement:** At age 65, account holder receives remaining balance after deducting: healthcare costs used, education costs used, and minimum system return ($50,000).

### 4.2 Projected Growth

At 6.88% annual return, $25,000 grows to approximately $1.89 million over 65 years. After deducting average healthcare costs ($400,000 cap), education costs (~$155,000), and system return ($50,000), the typical retiree receives approximately $1.28 million.

This creates a wealth floor that transforms the economic position of lower-income Americans. Currently, the median retirement savings for Americans approaching retirement is approximately $120,000. Under this system, even those with zero additional savings would have nearly $2 million.

### 4.3 Market Stabilization Effects

A key feature of Stability Accounts is their countercyclical effect on financial markets. With approximately 4 million births annually, plus accounts for new citizens, the system creates approximately $100 billion in mandatory annual investment inflows.

These inflows continue regardless of market conditions. During market downturns, Stability Accounts are buying at low prices. During market upturns, the continuous inflows maintain demand. This structural buying pressure dampens volatility and supports long-term returns.

Norway's Government Pension Fund Global provides evidence for this effect. As the world's largest sovereign wealth fund (~$1.4 trillion), its continuous investment regardless of market conditions has contributed to market stability while achieving strong long-term returns.

### 4.4 Comparison to Existing Proposals

**Baby bonds proposals** (Booker-Pressley American Opportunity Accounts Act, Connecticut Baby Bonds): These typically propose $1,000-$2,000 at birth, growing to approximately $50,000 by adulthood for wealth-building purposes. Stability Accounts differ in scale ($25,000 initial deposit, $2M+ at retirement), scope (integrated healthcare/education funding), and mechanism (replacing rather than supplementing existing programs).

**Universal Basic Income:** UBI provides ongoing cash transfers regardless of circumstance. Stability Accounts provide lump-sum initial investment plus funded services. The mechanisms differ: UBI is a flow, Stability Accounts are a stock. UBI requires ongoing taxation for funding; Stability Accounts become self-sustaining as recoveries begin.

**Social Security:** Social Security is pay-as-you-go, with current workers funding current retirees. Stability Accounts are fully funded, with each generation's accounts invested from birth. This eliminates demographic dependency (the "aging population" problem) and creates actual asset ownership rather than programmatic entitlement.

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## 5. Fiscal Projections

### 5.1 Year 1 Budget

**Revenue:**
- GRT (13.2% × $46T × 0.95): $5.77T
- Tariffs and excise: $0.50T
- Other revenue: $1.50T
- **Total: $7.77T**

**Spending:**
- Healthcare: $2.02T
- Education: $0.74T
- Defense: $0.80T
- Debt service: $0.90T
- Other (infrastructure, safety net, administration): $2.01T
- **Total: $6.47T**

**Surplus: $1.30T**

### 5.2 Year 30 Budget

**Revenue:**
- GRT (5.5% × $118T × 0.95): $6.16T
- Tariffs and excise: $0.80T
- Other revenue (including Alliance): $2.30T
- **Total: $9.26T**

**Spending:**
- Healthcare: $4.50T
- Education: $1.70T
- Defense: $0.20T
- Debt service: $0.00T
- Other: $3.00T
- **Total: $9.40T**

**Near-balanced:** Slight deficit in Year 30 offset by prior surpluses; subsequent years return to surplus as Stability Account recoveries begin.

### 5.3 Debt Elimination Timeline

| Year | Debt | Debt/GDP |
|------|------|----------|
| 1 | $35.0T | 120% |
| 10 | $26.5T | 43% |
| 20 | $10.5T | 13% |
| 30 | $0 | 0% |

Debt elimination results from consistent surpluses applied to principal reduction, with declining interest payments accelerating the process in later years.

### 5.4 Sensitivity Analysis

**GDP Growth (base 3.2%):**
- At 4.0%: Year 30 revenue +$2.0T
- At 2.5%: Year 30 revenue -$1.5T

**GRT Evasion (base 5%):**
- At 3%: Year 30 revenue +$0.3T
- At 8%: Year 30 revenue -$0.4T

**Healthcare Efficiency (base 15% savings):**
- At 20%: Year 30 spending -$0.4T
- At 10%: Year 30 spending +$0.3T

**Stability Account Returns (base 6.88%):**
- At 8.0%: Retirement balance +$0.8M
- At 5.5%: Retirement balance -$1.0M

**Model break points:** The framework fails to achieve debt elimination if GDP growth falls below 1.5% sustained, or if GRT evasion exceeds 15% (matching current income tax gap), or if healthcare costs grow at 6%+ annually.

---

## 6. Political Economy Challenges

### 6.1 Constitutional Requirements

Full implementation requires constitutional amendments for:
- Balanced budget requirement
- Stability Account protection (preventing future Congresses from raiding accounts)
- GRT authorization (replacing income tax authority)
- Algorithmic monetary policy (removing Federal Reserve discretion)

Constitutional amendments require two-thirds approval in both houses of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures. This high bar ensures only broadly supported changes pass—only 27 amendments have been ratified in 235 years. This is precisely the level of consensus AIP requires.

### 6.2 The Crisis Window Hypothesis

However, major structural reforms historically follow crisis conditions:
- The New Deal followed the Great Depression
- Civil rights legislation followed years of protest and unrest
- The Affordable Care Act followed the 2008 financial crisis

The anticipated Medicare insolvency (~2031) and Social Security insolvency (~2034) will create crisis conditions affecting every American. Politicians who have resisted reform for decades will face constituents demanding solutions.

The question is not whether reform will occur, but what form it will take. If coherent alternatives exist and have been developed, debated, and refined, they become available options. If only incremental patches have been considered, crisis produces patchwork rather than transformation.

### 6.3 Interest Group Opposition

Several concentrated interests would oppose this framework:
- **Tax preparation industry:** ~$11B annually eliminated
- **Healthcare insurance administration:** significantly reduced role
- **Tax lawyers and accountants:** complexity-dependent business models
- **Wealthy individuals using avoidance strategies:** loopholes eliminated

These groups have significant lobbying resources. However, during crisis conditions, concentrated interests lose leverage against diffuse public pressure.

### 6.4 Coalition Building

The framework has potential appeal across ideological lines:

**Conservative appeal:**
- Eliminates income tax and IRS filing
- Balanced budget requirement
- Individual ownership of retirement assets
- Reduced government bureaucracy

**Progressive appeal:**
- Universal healthcare
- Universal education
- Wealth floor for all Americans
- Corporations pay without loopholes

**Libertarian appeal:**
- Massive simplification
- Individual accounts vs. government entitlements
- Market mechanisms for investment

The coalition that passes this framework will be unusual—but crisis creates unusual coalitions.

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## 7. Limitations and Invited Critique

### 7.1 Acknowledged Limitations

**65-year lag:** Full Stability Account benefits require 65 years to materialize. Individuals born before implementation never receive full benefits. Transition provisions are necessary but imperfect.

**Untested at scale:** No nation has implemented this combination of mechanisms. Unknown emergent effects are possible. Phased implementation and state-level pilots could reduce but not eliminate this risk.

**Implementation complexity:** Despite simpler steady-state operation, transition from current systems is enormously complex. Bureaucratic resistance, technical challenges, and political obstacles could derail implementation.

**Model uncertainty:** All projections rely on assumptions that may prove incorrect. Even with sensitivity analysis, unknown unknowns remain.

**Centralization risks:** Universal accounts and simplified taxation create new vectors for government overreach or system capture. Constitutional protections help but do not eliminate this risk.

### 7.2 Specific Critiques Invited

We specifically invite critique on:

1. **GRT incidence analysis:** Is the lifecycle progressivity argument valid? What distributional effects have we underestimated?

2. **Stability Account return assumptions:** Is 6.88% sustainable? What is the impact of structural inflows on market dynamics?

3. **Fiscal projection methodology:** Where are the models weakest? What variables have we overlooked?

4. **Political economy:** What makes this more or less feasible than we've assessed? What coalition dynamics are we missing?

5. **International comparisons:** What can we learn from VAT implementation elsewhere? From sovereign wealth fund performance? From baby bonds programs?

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## 8. Conclusion

This paper has presented a comprehensive economic framework addressing wealth inequality, healthcare access, and fiscal sustainability through structural accountability mechanisms rather than traditional redistribution.

The core insight is simple: when cheating is harder than cooperating, rational actors cooperate. The GRT makes tax evasion structurally difficult. Stability Accounts create universal wealth through compound growth rather than transfers. The combination produces positive-sum outcomes where corporations profit more because their customers are richer, and workers prosper more because their employment creates genuine value.

We make no claim that this framework is politically feasible under current conditions. Constitutional amendments require extraordinary consensus. Concentrated interests oppose change. Implementation requires sustained effort.

However, the alternative—$180 trillion debt, healthcare system collapse, climate failure, democratic erosion—represents existential risk. This framework is not one option among many; it may represent the best of difficult options and the last window for peaceful, systematic transformation before critical systems fail beyond repair.

But conditions are not normal. Medicare insolvency approaches. Social Security follows close behind. The fiscal trajectory is mathematically unsustainable. Something will change—the only question is whether that change is constructive or chaotic.

We offer this framework not as the answer, but as an answer—one that deserves serious examination, rigorous critique, and continued refinement. The alternative is arriving at the crisis window with nothing but incremental patches for a system that has already failed.

We invite economists, policymakers, and citizens to engage with these ideas. Find the holes. Challenge the assumptions. Propose improvements. The stakes are too high for any proposal to be treated as sacred. But they are also too high for any serious alternative to be dismissed without examination.

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Hamilton, D., & Darity, W. (2010). Can 'baby bonds' eliminate the racial wealth gap? *Review of Black Political Economy.*

Hurwicz, L. (1960). Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes. *Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences.*

Internal Revenue Service. (2023). *Tax Gap Estimates.*

Medicare Trustees. (2024). *Annual Report of the Board of Trustees.*

Myerson, R. (1981). Optimal auction design. *Mathematics of Operations Research.*

Social Security Trustees. (2024). *Annual Report of the Board of Trustees.*

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*Working paper. Comments welcome. Contact: [Email]*

*Please cite as: [Last Name], C. (2025). Beyond Redistribution: Accountability Mechanisms as a Third Way in Economic Policy. SSRN Working Paper.*